History and context of the automotive industry crisis

The "Big Three" U.S. market share has declined from 70% in 1998 to 53% in 2008. They have lost market share to imports and "transplants" (cars made in U.S. factories owned by foreign makers).

Facing steady financial losses, the Big Three have closed many factories and drastically cut employment, especially in Michigan. GM spun off many of its employees in certain divisions into independent companies, including American Axle in 1994 and Delphi in 1999. Ford spun off Visteon in 2000. The spin-offs and other parts makers have shared Detroit's downturns, as have the U.S.-owned plants in Canada. Altogether the parts makers employ 416,000 people in the U.S. and Canada. General Motors alone is estimated to have lost $51 billion in the three years before the 2008 financial crisis began.

The Big Three are distinguished not just by their size and geography, but also by their business model. The majority of their operations are unionized (United Auto Workers and Canadian Auto Workers), resulting in higher labor costs than other multinational automakers, including those with plants in North America, which have managed to keep out unions. The 2005 Harbour Report estimated that Toyota's lead in labor productivity amounted to a cost advantage of $350 US to $500 US per vehicle over North American manufacturers. The UAW agreed to a two-tier wage in recent 2007 negotiations, something which the CAW has so far refused. Delphi, which was spun off from GM in 1999, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy after the UAW refused to cut their wages and GM is expected to be liable for a $7 billion shortfall.

In order to improve profits, the Detroit automakers made deals with unions to reduce wages while making pension and health care commitments. GM, for instance, at one time picked up the entire cost of funding health insurance premiums of its employees, their survivors and GM retirees, as the US did not have a universal health care system. With most of these plans chronically underfunded in the late 1990s, the companies have tried to provide retirement packages to older workers, and made agreements with the UAW to transfer pension obligations to an independent trust. Nonetheless, non-unionized Japanese automakers, with their younger American workforces (and far fewer American retirees) will continue to enjoy a cost advantage.

Despite the history of their marques, many long running cars have been discontinued or relegated to fleet sales, as the Big Three shifted away resources from midsize and compact cars to lead the "SUV Craze". Since the late 1990s, over half of their profits have come from light trucks and SUVs, while they often could not break even on compact cars unless the buyer chose options. Ron Harbour, in releasing the Oliver Wyman’s 2008 Harbour Report, stated that many small “econoboxes” of the past acted as loss leaders, but were designed to bring customers to the brand in the hopes they would stay loyal and move up to more profitable models. The report estimated that an automaker needed to sell ten small cars to make the same profit as one big vehicle, and that they had to produce small and mid-size cars profitably to succeed, something that the Detroit three have not yet done. SUV sales peaked in 1999 but have not returned to that level ever since, due to high gas prices. The Big Three have suffered from perceived inferior initial quality and reliability compared to their Japanese counterparts, which has been difficult to overcome. They have also been slow to bring new vehicles to the market, while the Japanese are also considered the leader at producing smaller, fuel-efficient cars.

Falling sales and market share have resulted in the Big Three's plants operating below capacity (GM's plants were at 85% in November 2005, well below the plants of its Asian competitors), leading to production cuts, plant closures and layoffs. They have been relying heavily on considerable incentives and subsidized leases to sell vehicles. which was crucial to keeping the plants running, which in turn drove a significant portion of the Michigan economy. These promotional strategies, including rebates, employee pricing and 0% financing, have boosted sales but have also cut into profits. More importantly such promotions drain the automaker's cash reserves in the near term while in the long run the company suffers the stigma of selling vehicles because of low price instead of technical merit. Automakers have since been trying to scale back on incentives and raise prices, while cutting production. The subprime mortgage crisis and high oil prices in 2008 resulting in the plummeting popularity of best-selling trucks and SUVs, perhaps forcing automakers to continue offering heavy incentives to help clear excess inventory.

In 2008, with high oil prices and a declining US economy due to the subprime mortgage crisis, the Big Three are rethinking their strategy, idling or converting light truck plants to make small cars. Due to the declining residual value of their vehicles, Chrysler and GM have stopped offering leases on the majority of their vehicles.

On September 30, 2008, the first automaker loan package, for $25 billion, was signed into law. The bill sets aside $7.5 billion in taxpayer funds needed to guarantee $25 billion in low-interest loans to help US automakers produce more fuel-efficient cars and trucks.

The crisis has led to warnings of massive unemployment and economic recession if not contained, and Democrats in Congress, supported by President-Elect Barack Obama have called for a "bridge loan" to assist the Big Three. On October 13, 2008, Obama said that he wanted Congress to double its guaranteed loans to the U.S. automobile industry from $25 billion to $50 billion.

This guide is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia.

Video: Josu Ortuondo Larrea on the car industry